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Damian Veal’s paper has a clear overall narrative: it takes the form of an 
investigation into why I ask the question of the meaning of life, despite the fact 
that I do not think there is one, and why I insist upon (Veal’s context) or argue 
(the book’s context, I maintain) that this question is central to philosophical 
inquiry. This is presented as a mystery, the solution to which requires a 
painstaking assemblage of all the clues. In the penultimate section, entitled, ‘Why 
this Question, again?’, Veal announces the result of his investigation. Here is what 
he says: 
 
In order to provide an adequate answer to our question, I think, there is a 
piece of the puzzle that still needs to be added. For Philosophy in a 
Meaningless Life comprises not only a metaphilosophical thesis about the 
nature of philosophy, but also a metaphysical thesis about the nature of 
reality itself. Though I have only been able to explore some aspects of the 
former thesis in this paper, I suspect it is because he wants to forge a 
connection between these two theses that he insists upon formulating the 
question of the meaning of life in the way that he does. For, in a nutshell, 
Tartaglia argues that there is a wider context of existence beyond the 
physical universe after all, and that this wider context of existence, upon 
which the existence of the physical universe depends, is nothing other than 
consciousness. And to cut a long story short, Tartaglia thinks he has found 
a way to utilise his metaphysical thesis about the transcendence of 
consciousness to secure an autonomous space for a priori philosophical 
inquiry and to fortify it against the unwanted incursions of natural science. 
(pp. 246-7) 
 
This is the culmination of his narrative. Afterwards, there is no time for him to 
say where I went wrong (I engaged in a ‘whole lot of skilful gerrymandering’ (pp. 
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248-9)), and so he instead proceeds to allow his criticisms to become quite 
extreme, thankfully only for a short while, before finally providing his own, 
positive take on the question of the meaning of life; a question hitherto disparaged 
at every step. Veal’s main investigation was successful, however, because I did 
indeed write a book which connects the question of the meaning of life with a 
thesis about consciousness and the nature of philosophy. The final chapter is 
called ‘Nihilism, Transcendence and Philosophy’; ‘Nihilism’ is my answer to the 
meaning of life question, and ‘Transcendence’ pertains to my accounts of 
consciousness and the nature of philosophy. But I did not save this connection for 
the last chapter. Rather I said exactly what I was going to do in the introduction, 
and then proceeded to argue for my position throughout the book. So I can only 
conclude that the investigative narrative of Veal’s paper is really just a dramatic 
device, employed to allow him to hold the whole of my book up the incredulous, 
disapproving stares which he seems to imagine whenever he quotes me; which is 
a lot. 
Still, I think I can see his underlying concern. Veal thinks the question of the 
meaning of life is ambiguous and can be interpreted in many different ways. He 
thinks I have chosen a particular interpretation simply because it ties in with my 
account of consciousness; and that this is not a good reason for side-lining 
alternative interpretations. I, for my part, think that my interpretation is 
independently plausible. I take it to be the most natural interpretation of the 
question, whatever metaphysical commitments you might hold, and find aversion 
to this interpretation a reasonable cause for suspicion. If I were a physicalist, I 
would still interpret the question this way, look for a wider context than human 
society from which the existence and value of human life could be explained, find 
none, and conclude both that nihilism is true and that the question arose because 
people suspected that there was a transcendent context capable of delivering a 
positive answer to the question. My conclusion would still have been that this 
interpretation of the question has been avoided because nihilism has mistakenly 
been thought of as a negative evaluation, due to theological assumptions. As it is, 
however, my account of consciousness leads me to believe that reality does in fact 
transcend our physical conception of it. So seeing this connection between the 
question of the meaning of life and consciousness, these accounts became 
mutually reinforcing. The connection does not motivate my interpretation of the 
question; rather it provides a better explanation of why that interpretation has been 
avoided, and one which is revealing about the nature of philosophy. 
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Although the passage I quoted above does capture the broad aims of my book, 
it nevertheless contains two important misrepresentations of my position; so given 
that I have now quoted it, I shall point out what they are. The first is where Veal 
says, ‘this wider context of existence, upon which the existence of the physical 
universe depends, is nothing other than consciousness’. I explicitly deny this; I 
say that it depends on the final context, which cannot be a context of 
consciousness. Veal knows this, because he immediately adds a footnote saying 
that this is a ‘slight oversimplification’ (p. 247; his emphasis); but that he has no 
time to explain why my position ultimately collapses into the one he presents. The 
second misrepresentation is when Veal says that I want to, ‘utilise [my] 
metaphysical thesis about the transcendence of consciousness to secure an 
autonomous space for a priori philosophical inquiry and to fortify it against the 
unwanted incursions of natural science’. This is misleading, because although I 
think the recognition of transcendence goes a long way towards revealing the 
relatively autonomous space in which philosophical inquiry takes place, Veal is 
suggesting that I am trying to insulate philosophy because I am afraid natural 
science can do a better job on the same tasks. Rather, I argue against the 
philosophy of physicalism because I think science and philosophy have very 
different tasks. The only ‘unwanted incursions’ in question are from scientists who 
engage with philosophical questions while simultaneously disparaging 
philosophy. 
Veal begins his paper by telling us that anyone who knows some science 
knows that a biological species is not the kind of thing which could have an overall 
meaning. Since humans are a biological species, then, the question of the meaning 
of life, as I present it, is nonsensical; an alternative conclusion, which Veal 
overlooks, would be that nihilism is necessarily true. There are two reasons why 
neither of these options can be right. The first is that just because science has a 
way of talking about our lives according to which the question of overall meaning 
does not naturally arise, it does not follow that it cannot arise; for scientific 
discourse occurs in the wider context of life. In talking about water scientifically, 
issues about taste may never arise, but we are still talking about something for 
which such issues do arise; as can be seen from the fact that, given how well 
known this example has become, people can talk about ‘the taste of this H2O’ and 
be readily understood. The second reason is that if the question really were 
nonsensical, then it would be impossible for reality to be such that either a positive 
or negative answer to it was true. Nihilism may be false, just as positive accounts, 
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according to which human life exists within a context of meaning, may be false; 
but we have no reason to think that these positions are necessarily false, simply in 
virtue of the concepts involved, unless an argument can be provided to show that 
formulating them involves a contradiction.   
If Veal had an argument of this kind, to support his claim that, ‘we have long 
since known that biological species are not the sorts of things that could have 
“overall meanings” or purposes’ (p. 209), then the rest of the paper would have 
been unnecessary. Instead, he soon backtracks to the claim that it makes ‘dubious 
sense at best to ask about the overall meaning of a biological species’ (p. 218). He 
is not sure whether it makes sense, then, but proceeding on the assumption that it 
does, he asks why I made sense of it the way I did. He thinks I should have 
followed the consensus of saying that the question is very obscure, as ‘a prelude 
to getting clear about the variety of ways it can be, has been, and might 
legitimately be construed’ (p. 214). He thinks that unlike other philosophers, I 
neglect the project of conceptual analysis (p. 215). 
I provided an analysis of the question according to which it has two 
components; an existential component concerning the reason we exist, and an 
evaluative component about that reason. I argued that if nihilism is true, it cannot 
be an evaluative fact. I then proceeded to distinguish four different senses of social 
meaning / meaning in life, showing how two of these senses have been the focus 
of recent debates, and that a failure to distinguish them both from each other, and 
from the sense in which life itself might have a meaning, has led philosophers to 
argue at cross-purposes and draw conclusions about the meaning of life from 
premises about social meaning. I argued that there are also two senses of seeming 
meaningfulness, namely as manifest but defeasible conscious presentation and as 
judgement, and that inattention to this distinction undermines the most popular 
approach to social meaning in the debate, namely the combined subjective-
objective account. All of this transpires in the introduction, which Veal quotes 
more than any other part of the book – but you would never guess from his paper. 
In the book, I claim that the reason the question ‘what is the meaning of life?’ 
has acquired the iconic status it has within our culture, is that it is a natural 
question which people have always asked and probably always will. This is a 
disconcerting question to ask for those without religious faith, given the negative 
connotations of nihilism (which I reject); and so I make the case that since recent 
philosophy has wanted to align itself with science, philosophers have tried to 
reinterpret the question in terms of social meaning. Through a combination of 
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these factors and others, two ideas have acquired currency both inside and outside 
philosophy, namely that the question is obscure and that it can be answered with 
an account of social meaning. As a naturalist / physicalist, Veal objects to me 
saying things like this. I should not have made such claims without firm empirical 
evidence, and it was arrogant of me to suggest that I have seen something others 
have overlooked. From the comfort of my armchair, as he thinks of it, I alighted 
on this particular interpretation of the question of the meaning of life, and ran with 
it because it allowed me to make a connection to consciousness, which I saw as 
the best defence old-fashioned metaphysics still has against the encroachments of 
science into its traditional territory.  
As I see it, however, I was simply trying to do some original philosophical 
thinking. If you agree with the consensus on a topic, then that option is not open 
to you; but the consensus I discovered when I looked into what philosophers were 
currently saying about the meaning of life did not seem right to me. So I thought 
about it and said what did seem right to me, trying to make my case as 
convincingly as I could, and trying to connect what I now thought about this topic, 
with other issues I had been thinking about for years. One thing that struck me 
was that neither the question of the nature of philosophy nor the question of the 
meaning of life had received much attention in recent philosophy; which seemed 
odd. However, I knew that there had been considerable and sustained opposition 
to physicalist accounts of consciousness, so I was not alone there, at least. I came 
to the conclusion that it was physicalism that had relegated the question of the 
nature of philosophy to the side-lines, and thereby inspired a misinterpretation of 
the question of the meaning of life.  
When I defended this position, it was not in order to assert what I consider 
plausible as superior to what everyone else considers plausible. It was in the hope 
that others would find what I had to say plausible, or at least some aspects of it. 
That is how philosophical debate works. If I had agreed with the consensus, there 
would have been nothing new for me to say; and if I did not, then I should have 
said so – as indeed I did. The hope was that people who came across these ideas, 
might think things like: ‘Yes, maybe nihilism isn’t so bad after all’; ‘Yes, maybe 
the meaning of life is an interesting philosophical question, and not just something 
for religious people’; ‘Yes, maybe questions about the meaning of life and 
meaning in life are distinct, and maybe there is a legitimate secular answer to the 
former’; ‘Yes, maybe the question of the nature of philosophy has received some 
suspiciously murky answers, and maybe this has something to do with the 
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influence of physicalism’; ‘Yes, you can have a clean conscience about science 
while rejecting physicalism; perhaps we’re not in the same business after all.’ 
There were bound to be some ‘no’ answers too, of course, and when you encounter 
them, you look into the reasoning. That is how philosophical debate works; there 
is nothing remotely unusual about my book in this respect. 
To show that people do not typically have my question in mind when they talk 
about the meaning of life, Veal turns to an example I gave in a paper (Tartaglia 
2015), where I distinguished the meaning in a film, from the meaning of a film 
within a wider context than that set up by the film itself. Veal dismisses the need 
for ordinary language analysis or experimental philosophy to assess my example, 
and instead relies upon an internet search (p. 218); note how his criticisms of my 
methodology go by the wayside as soon as he wants to make a claim. What he 
finds is that when people ask about the meaning of a film, they are looking for an 
explanation or interpretation of the film. Perhaps so, but then they are evidently 
not distinguishing between the meaning in and of the film. My point was that such 
a distinction can be made. It makes perfect sense to ask about the meaning of a 
film in a wider social context, rather than about the meaning within the film, and 
if you did want to make that distinction, it is clear which idiom would be more 
appropriate; if you wanted to talk about the meaning in a film in a wider social 
context, this would suggest that you did not want to talk about the film as a whole, 
but rather something specific within it. I was trying to show that a similar 
distinction can be made between meaning in life and the meaning of life; and that 
if you make the in / of distinction, then it is quite clear which would be more 
appropriate to the social meaning question, and which to the traditional question. 
Thaddeus Metz now seems to accept this (Metz 2015). Veal takes the example 
more seriously than I ever would, however, because on the basis of his discovery 
about films, he decides that what people are really looking for when they ask about 
the meaning of life is a ‘a global narrative, worldview or explanatory framework 
within which to make overall sense of their lives’ (p. 218); an idea he returns to at 
the end of his paper, by which point his worries about biological species, and 
respect for diversity of opinion about the nature of the question, are apparently all 
behind him. 
Next Veal begins to criticise me at length for – according to him – saying that 
‘meaning’, ‘value’, ‘significance’ and ‘purpose’ are synonymous. He begins by 
quoting me: 
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there is only one obvious philosophical question in the area, to which senses 
like “value,” “significance” and “purpose” are easily related. (p. 219 / PML, 
p. 2) 
 
The reader will note that I said: ‘are easily related’. The view I proceeded to 
explain, without any explicit or implicit claims about synonymy, is that given the 
existential import of the question, we are looking for a reason why we exist; and 
given the evaluative component, the question presupposes that this reason will 
make our lives valuable or significant in some way – the term ‘significant’ is more 
conducive to a non-moral interpretation than ‘valuable’, although they can be used 
synonymously in this context. I also said that a great part of our interest in the 
question is provided by the prospect that the reason we exist gives life a purpose. 
Later, Veal says that what my interpretation of the question really ‘boils down to 
is simply this: “Why did God create us?”’ (p. 223). But knowing why God created 
us would simply push the question back a stage to the question of why God exists, 
and of what value there was to his fulfilling his intentions by creating us; I 
discussed this in the book. 
With the apparently wilful misreadings now stacking up fast, Veal goes on to 
ask why ‘rejecting the presupposition of a theological question should transform 
it into a “philosophical” question’ (p. 225). What Veal has in mind is my claim 
that if you neglect the existential component of the question, then it is transformed 
into either a theological question about which particular meaning God invested in 
life, or a question about social meaning. I did not say that the question is 
theological, however, but rather that if you presuppose that its evaluative 
component must receive a certain kind of religious answer, and focus only on 
specifying the exact nature of the answer, then your concern with it is purely 
theological. It is always going to be a philosophical question – a paradigmatically 
philosophical one, in fact – but those with religious or physicalist convictions tend 
to neglect its existential component, and hence consider only its evaluative 
component, because they think they already know the answer to the existential 
component: typically, that God created reality, for the religious; or that science 
explains why there is a reality – or that the question does not make sense – for the 
physicalists. I think both sides are wrong about this, but nevertheless, within their 
religious or physicalist frameworks, they are asking a philosophical question; they 
just think that only one part of it needs to be addressed.  
The reason I reject any theological presupposition to the question is, rather 
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obviously, that I think nihilism is true. Veal thinks this creates huge tensions, to 
put it mildly, with my placing the question at the centre of my account of 
philosophy. This line of criticism steadily builds in intensity until Veal finally says 
that, 
 
It would seem to follow, then, that the entire history of philosophy and 
religion—and science, too, inasmuch as it lacked self-consciousness about 
its proper role and was thus guided by a ‘confused quest’ —has been based 
upon little more than a rationally unmotivated, idle, cheap conceptual 
possibility. (p. 243) 
   
The main points that arise along the way, and which are supposed to establish this 
conclusion, are: firstly, that it is ridiculous to argue that the question unifies 
philosophy when I reject its ‘core presupposition’ (p. 226); secondly, that my 
rejection of the claim that life is absurd is incompatible with claiming that the 
question of the meaning of life is legitimate (p. 228); thirdly, that the notion of 
intrinsic value required to provide a positive answer to the question is incoherent 
(pp. 230-2); fourthly, that I do not provide a good reason to reject positive answers 
to the question (p. 234); and fifthly, that my conception of a wider context of 
meaning is incoherent (pp. 232-7).  
The answer to the first critical point is that I think the question of the meaning 
of life directs us to the concept of transcendence, which we need to make 
metaphysical sense of the world. That I did not ask the question in a theological 
context has nothing to do with this, because as I tried to show, there are reasons 
to believe that reality is transcendent, whether or not you think the transcendent 
context is meaningful. I reject a certain kind of answer to the question, of the kind 
which has traditionally been presupposed, but not the question itself. 
The second objection is good; the section on absurdity in my book does not 
answer it explicitly – although I did address a similar argument by Metz (PML, p. 
191). In the section in question, I argue that life is not absurd; it only seems that 
way if we compare life to the religious meaning which we find it not to have. But 
if we are not to evaluate life according to this absent transcendent meaning, why 
claim that life is meaningless? Why use a measure of meaning that we reject in 
order to claim that life is meaningless? The answer is that if we do not think there 
is transcendent meaning, then we have no reason to evaluate life as absurd in light 
of its absence; but we may still think that reality is transcendent, as I argue that it 
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is. If reality is transcendent, and hence a transcendent reality provides the final 
context in which life exists, the question arises of whether that context provides 
our lives with meaning; a question that is firmly embedded in our history, but is a 
natural enough one to ask in any case. I think that the transcendence of reality 
does not provide us with a good reason to think it is meaningful; and this explains 
why I do not think we should use a transcendent measure of meaning to provide 
the basis for a judgement that life is absurd.    
The third point is only partly a question for me, because, like Veal, I think 
there is only relational value. Many think there is intrinsic value, however, such 
as Metz (2013: 92-3). Veal goes too far when he claims that intrinsic value is 
impossible: ‘I find that I’m unable to conceive of any such thing in any possible 
world’, he says (p. 231). This must have made learning about the history of 
philosophy difficult; Plato’s theory of forms, for instance, which Veal apparently 
thinks was an exclusively ethical theory with a relativistic commitment. If we trust 
Veal’s conceivability intuitions, however, then the notion of intrinsic value must 
be contradictory, in which case either the question of the meaning of life 
necessarily has a negative answer; or else Veal might revert to his original position, 
with a little more substance this time, by claiming that the question is incoherent 
given that it embodies a contradictory notion of meaning. But there is nothing 
contradictory here. If Veal cannot imagine intrinsic meaning, this is only because 
he presupposes a physical conception of reality, and thinks that a physical 
characterisation of a thing would contradict a characterisation of that same thing 
as intrinsically valuable. I am inclined to agree about the latter, but many, such as 
Metz, would not. But in any case, if reality is transcendent, as I think it is, then 
there is no question of our conception of something which is valuable according 
to its own nature, conflicting with our conception of fundamental reality, because 
we have no positive conception of fundamental reality for it to conflict with. 
The fourth point is accurate enough. I do not provide any new arguments for 
thinking that life is meaningless; I do not have any. As any reader of the book 
should quickly ascertain, that is not my focus. My focus is on reconfiguring 
nihilism and showing that it answers a legitimate question; my focus is on 
understanding ‘philosophy in a meaningless life’. My own convictions about 
nihilism have been formed on the basis of objective thought, reflection on the 
nature of the framework, and suspicion of the various arguments for the existence 
of God. Nevertheless, my various positions on framework engagement, the fact 
of existence, the nature of philosophy, consciousness, and so on, do provide plenty 
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of reinforcement to those already inclined to believe that there is no meaning of 
life; while trying to assuage the natural worry that holding that reality is 
transcendent must conflict with this belief.   
The beginning of the fifth objection is worth quoting: 
 
But if meaning and value necessarily depend upon there being such a wider 
context—which is something Tartaglia insists upon throughout the book—
it is hard to see how he can coherently claim that human life is worthless 
on the grounds that it is not intrinsically valuable, …. (p. 232) 
 
(I shall, for now, withhold comment on the substitution of ‘worthless’ for 
‘meaningless’.) As Veal says, I think things only have a meaning within a wider 
context; in the case of our activities, this is the context provided by our social 
framework. But then, what is supposed to be anything less than fully coherent 
about claiming that if human life itself does not fit into a wider context of meaning, 
then it is meaningless? If the existence of life in the final context is intrinsically 
meaningful, then there is a meaning of life. But then life would be part of the final 
context, and hence would indeed exist within a wider context of existence. Not in 
the sense in which an action exists within the framework – a sense reflecting the 
fact that the framework is obviously not the final context – but rather in a sense 
more akin to that in which a tree fits into the physical universe. Essentially, the 
sense that human life exists in the final context, as everything that exists must. 
What is meant by ‘within a wider context of existence’ must be different 
depending on whether or not we are talking about the final context. My reasoning 
here is echoed by Veal: 
 
For even if God had a reason for creating the physical universe, if the only 
thing that can make a life meaningful is a wider context of meaning, then 
God’s life too would need to belong to such a wider context, and so on to 
infinity. If, on the other hand, God does not need any such wider context, 
then neither do we, …. (p. 237) 
 
All that could stop the regress is intrinsic meaning. So if God’s life were 
intrinsically meaningful in the final context, it would belong to a wider context 
only in the sense of being part of what that context amounts to; not in the sense 
that would defer us to something else that exists in order to account for its meaning 
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– because brute, meaningful existence would have been reached. Of course, I do 
not think there is any such existence, which is why I do not think there is a 
meaning of life. But it is a perfectly coherent idea of what could make life 
meaningful, and the only one I have either come across or can think of; it is what 
God, human beings, or anything else, would require in order to have a meaningful 
life. 
None of these five points remotely support Veal’s conclusion, with which I 
began this part of the discussion, about my supposed position on the entire history 
of philosophy, religion and science. And that just about brings us to the 
culmination of Veal’s narrative, where he reveals the plot of my book. But before 
I turn to what he says afterwards, I shall comment on his passing accusation that 
I misinterpreted Milton Munitz (p. 239); because Veal thinks this leaves me all 
alone, thereby highlighting how thoroughly idiosyncratic my position is. When I 
discovered Munitz’s work, I focused on the better-known Boundless Existence, 
but I did make one reference to his later Does Life Have A Meaning?, saying that 
in this book, ‘Munitz sometimes expresses his message about social meaning in 
an unnecessarily ambiguous manner’ (PML, p. 187). Further down the page from 
the quotation Veal provides, thinking he has found Munitz rejecting the traditional 
question, Munitz turns to ‘Boundless Existence’, or as I would say, transcendent 
reality, and says that ‘since Boundless Existence is Nothing, Emptiness, then in 
this respect life has no meaning either’ (Munitz 1993, p. 109). As I was saying, 
Munitz could have made his ‘yes and no’ answer a lot clearer (ibid., p. 113). 
After the culmination of Veal’s paper, there are three extraordinary pages (pp. 
253-5), in which he says that my book could foreseeably provoke both suicide 
and terrorism, and hence is deeply irresponsible. The reasoning, as regards the 
former, is that one of the most frequently cited reasons for suicide is the feeling 
that your life is ‘meaningless and worthless’ (p. 253). The reasoning, as regards 
the latter, is that terrorists who accept a particular, fundamentalist reading of their 
sacred texts, of the kind which Veal strongly suggests that he endorses as correct 
(pp. 254-5), think that mortal life is meaningless / worthless, but that transcendent 
reality is paradise. Since Veal thinks, or at least says, that I take essentially the 
same view – which requires him to disregard pretty much everything about the 
book, including the first sentence of the preface, even – then since Veal also thinks 
this fundamentalist reading encourages the killing of unbelievers, he accuses my 
position of helping to justify terrorist suicide attacks. Given the fundamentalist 
reading, which Veal strongly suggests that he endorses, he is prepared to ask: ‘who 
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can blame them?’ (p. 255). 
It is now high time to comment on the meaningless / worthless issue. The 
word ‘worthless’ appears thirty-six times in Veal’s paper. It appears nine times in 
my book: twice in a discussion on page 6, once in a quotation from Robert Nozick 
on page 18, and six times in a discussion on page 171. In both of the discussions, 
the point I argue for – and it is abundantly clear that the only reason I use the word 
‘worthless’ is to make this point – is that the metaphysical sense in which I am 
saying that life is meaningless, is not the social sense in which we might condemn 
life as worthless. This is what I say the first time: 
 
If life has a meaning, then, this could be bad. But nihilism cannot be. To 
say that life is meaningless is to say that it is valueless or worthless; but 
only in the sense that value is not essential to what it is. It is not to say that 
we are worthless in the socially contextual sense that would amount to a 
condemnation. (PML, p. 6) 
 
And this is what I say the second time: 
 
The straightforward mistake at the root of all elaborate attempts to escape 
from nihilism is an equation of ‘meaningless’ with ‘socially worthless’. It 
is perfectly reasonable that people should want to avoid condemning life as 
worthless in this sense, of course; worthless things are bad, and unless we 
can reform them, we generally want to either ignore or get rid of them. 
Arguably mosquitoes are worthless. If human life were worthless, then 
extreme, unrestricted misanthropy and so-called antinatalism – the view 
that being born is bad and that the extinction of the human race would be 
good – would not be absurd. And if we did take this kind of view seriously, 
the solution to our predicament would be obvious, just as Epicurus saw: it 
would be to solve Camus’s ‘one truly serious philosophical problem’ with 
suicide. Thankfully (if rather conveniently) the advocates of these views 
usually manage to persuade themselves that this is not the solution. 
However, the judgement that life is socially worthless is an evaluation 
whereas the judgement that life is meaningless is not. (p. 171) 
 
The reader can now see all of my eight uses of the word ‘worthless’. There is no 
trace of an argument in Veal’s paper to the effect that the above reasoning fails, 
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and hence that, in discussing my position, ‘worthless’ is a valid substitution for 
‘meaningless’. So in light of this, it does not strike me as reasonable academic 
practice to continually make this substitution, or else place ‘meaningless’ and 
‘worthless’ alongside each other as if I considered them synonymous. 
Now in the first quotation above, I said, ‘To say that life is meaningless is to 
say that it is valueless or worthless’; and immediately qualified this by saying that 
I do not mean in ‘the socially contextual sense that would amount to a 
condemnation’. In the metaphysical sense, life is indeed worthless; and loveless; 
and hateless, etc., because the final context of reality is not a context of meaning. 
No evaluative concepts can apply to our existence if there is no meaning of life; 
and when we do sometimes, outside of metaphysics, apply them to life as a whole, 
I think we almost inevitably say something either vacuous or false (PML, p. 53, 
56). The reason I alighted upon worthlessness in particular to make my point, is 
because I think the false view that nihilism is negatively evaluative results from 
confusing it with a social condemnation. As I say in the second passage, ‘The 
straightforward mistake at the root of all elaborate attempts to escape from 
nihilism is an equation of “meaningless” with “socially worthless”’. One of the 
main aims of my book was to diagnose the error of making this equation. Veal 
may still make it, but if there is anyone who it should not be attributed to, then 
that person is surely me. And yet this is what Veal does: again and again and again. 
There is a mention of suicide in the second passage. Here, as the passage 
makes quite clear, I had in mind misanthropic views, such as those of 
Schopenhauer, Cioran, and David Benatar, according to which human life is 
provided with a negative evaluation, and it is claimed that it would be better if we 
did not exist. My point was that if life could correctly be evaluated as worthless, 
which is an idea I consider completely absurd, then suicide would indeed seem 
like a sensible solution. I mentioned this kind of position because it shows the 
most extreme conclusion you could reach from mistakenly thinking of nihilism as 
a negative evaluation; a mistake I set out to diagnose, thereby undermining such 
positions, to the extent that they use nihilism as a motivation. Ray Brassier 
commented on Veal’s paper for him. Brassier wrote a book defending nihilism 
and opened his book with a quotation from Thomas Ligotti, who uses nihilism to 
utterly condemn human life. The other commentator was Metz. Metz thinks of 
nihilism as a negative evaluation; if a person lives a meaningless life, then this is 
certainly very bad, on his view, even if it does not follow that their life is socially 
worthless. So if there were anything to Veal’s extreme criticisms of my position, 
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I think Brassier and Metz would have a lot more to worry about than me. 
So let me start with the ‘lending encouragement to suicide’ idea. I wrote a 
book in which I argued that nihilism is not an evaluation, and in which I attacked 
the view that the question of the meaning of life concerns social meaning of a 
meritorious kind that can be measured and compared, such that one person might 
be praised for living a meaningful life, and another condemned for living a 
comparatively meaningless one. If somebody was worried by the thought that 
their life was meaningless, and could not be persuaded out of it, then I should have 
thought that this is exactly the kind of thing they would want to hear. For I am 
saying that there is no intellectual substance to the idea that their particular life 
has failed to reach the level of meaningfulness of other people’s, and hence is 
worthy of condemnation; and that in the only substantive sense in which life is 
meaningless, the same is true of everybody. Moreover, it is not bad that life is 
meaningless in this more weighty sense: to think that it is, is to make an 
intellectual error.  
Now for the ‘lending encouragement to terrorism’ idea. I wrote a book arguing 
that transcendent reality is meaningless and cannot be a context of consciousness; 
that all value and meaning resides within the mortal lives we find within the 
context of consciousness. If the terrorist is persuaded by that, then they have a 
decisive reason to call off their suicide attack, because they will no longer believe 
that it will take them to paradise; they will no longer believe there is a paradise, 
and will instead believe that they will never find any value except in mortal life, 
which is the only kind there is. 
Once more, let me try to find the underlying concern; for there must surely be 
one, even in these extreme cases. As Veal is aware, I think philosophy has become 
far too insular, and can counteract this by reconnecting with issues that matter to 
people, such as the meaning of life. His worry is that this is dangerous territory. 
People end their lives because they feel them to be meaningless, and the notion of 
transcendence persuades others to condemn this life as meaningless and to attack 
those who place value in it. On the most charitable interpretation I can muster, 
Veal realises that I am not promoting such notions, but worries that my views 
would be open to misinterpretation within the public domain; and that any attempt 
to revive interest in issues such as nihilism and transcendence is consequently 
irresponsible. In his view, such issues are best left alone; not only are they patent 
nonsense, as any respectable naturalist realises, but they are also dangerous in the 
wrong hands. 
 275
It seems to me, however, that these issues are already firmly in the public 
domain, and that it is the duty of academic philosophy to try to give rational 
direction to their discussion. If there are good reasons to think that nihilism is not 
an evaluative condemnation, as I think there are, then it must be a good thing to 
argue this, given the harm that the negative evaluation idea can have. Simply 
avoiding the topic is not going to help, not only because the view that nihilism is 
a negative evaluation is firmly embedded in many minds, as Veal’s examples show, 
but also because some philosophers continue to reinforce this view. Providing 
support to the religious view that reality is transcendent has its dangers, of course, 
but so does the naturalist dismissal of such views. For if the meaning of life is 
interpreted as a question of social meaning, not only does nihilism remain a 
negative evaluation, but the issue arises of how to draw a principled distinction 
between making your life socially meaningful in a moral, or at least non-immoral 
way, and making it socially meaningful in any way whatsoever; desire to achieve 
fame at any cost strikes me as evidently on the rise in our world, and a very 
worrying social trend. If defenders of a social conception of the meaning of life, 
as they think of it, continue to insist that the notion they have in mind precludes 
immoral action, and if defenders of the traditional conception continue to insist 
either that there is no transcendent context, or that there is one but that it cannot, 
or does not, usurp the value we find in life, then we are all on the right side. If we 
can find arguments to support these stances, we will potentially be doing some 
good. Saying nothing is not the answer from a social, pragmatic stance, because 
there are others on the wrong side; arguing against such views will not help their 
efforts. And from a more purely philosophical point of view, if the issues are 
legitimate, then philosophers should discuss them, so long as they do so 
responsibly. 
Veal finishes the paper with a naturalistic sketch of a theory of the meaning 
of life, as he thinks of it. He thinks that by, ‘placing our lives in the context of 
human history, human history in the context of the evolution of life on earth, and 
life on earth in the context of cosmological evolution, [we] can provide 
considerable meaning to our lives, both individually and collectively’ (p. 255). He 
says that we are special, both for our physical unusualness, and the fact that this 
has allowed us to acquire extensive knowledge about the universe; and that this is 
‘quite capable of providing “overall meaning” to our lives’ (p. 256). He goes on 
to say that our lives are made more meaningful when we reject the idea of an 
afterlife, and realise that our mortal lives are the only ones we will ever have (p. 
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256). 
This is the only part of the paper, except for the incongruous introduction, 
where my work is not being targeted; so my judgement that Veal seems to work 
best in this positive vein should perhaps be taken with a pinch of salt. However, 
if he does want to pursue this project, I think he would be well-advised to drop 
the phrase ‘the meaning of life’; given his deep suspicions about it, and the fact 
that the picture he has in mind would not address that issue. For it would not 
answer the existential component; this cannot be done within an exclusively 
naturalistic framework. Although some people might find that reflecting on their 
place with the natural world allows them to attribute a certain kind of value to 
human life as a whole, such value does not explain why human life exists. We are 
not here because we are physically unusual, if indeed we are. We are not here 
because we value the physical processes that produced us, if indeed we do; they 
certainly do not value us. Others who do not make the physicalist’s confusion of 
naturalistic knowledge with metaphysics might say, rather more naturally, that our 
capacity for love, for instance, attributes a certain kind of value to human life as 
a whole; but, ceteris paribus, this would be equally tangential to the question.  
Veal has simply looked for a question he can ask within an exclusively 
naturalistic framework; one which shadows in form the question of the meaning 
of life. But since it will not address the philosophical concerns behind that 
question, this simply muddies the waters. Perhaps this is what he wants to do; but 
if his concerns really are constructive, and if he is consistent, then I do not think 
it makes sense for him to allow a discredited theological agenda, as he sees it, to 
dictate his project. Nevertheless, I am perfectly open to the idea that naturalists 
may be able to say something plausible about our ‘specialness’, if that is 
something people desire. And maybe it could be argued that our lives acquire 
more social meaning when we no longer believe in a transcendent context of 
meaning; although I am sure religious believers would disagree, so this is one for 
them and the naturalists to discuss. Personally, I am very suspicious of such 
judgements, as I made plain in my book. 
Finally, a word on Veal’s title: ‘“Life is Meaningless.” Compared to What?’ I 
cannot see that it has much to do with the paper, but nevertheless, here is the 
answer I gave (at this point in the book, I was discussing the more specific 
hypothesis that life has a purpose): 
 
Life has no overall purpose compared to what? Compared to games, to how 
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things seem in the framework, and to how things might be if there is a wider 
context of meaning. We cannot give our lives this kind of purpose, but we 
do not need to anyway, because we have more localized and transitory 
purposes to occupy ourselves with. (PML, p. 56) 
 
This answer refers back to my reflections upon our typical absorption in the 
framework; reflections which bring nihilism into view. Veal pays no attention to 
any of this and so nihilism never comes into view for him. This is fine, since no 
one needs to engage in this kind of reflection if it does not interest them; that said, 
Veal was writing a critique of my book and he chose a title which suggested he 
would. Nevertheless, in light of his positive views, you would expect him to be 
sympathetic to at least the final sentence.  
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